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Quota discarding and distributive justice: the case of the under-10m fishing fleet in Sussex, 
England 
 
Tim Gray, R.C. Korda, Selina Stead, and Estelle Jones 
 
Abstract 
 
Marine fish discarding has become a contentious environmental issue, but little attention has been paid 
to the moral grievances that sometimes underlie discarding practices. This article explores such a moral 
grievance through a case study of the under-10m fishery in Sussex, England, where discarding of cod 
(Gadus morhua) has become a highly charged issue, skippers blaming it on inadequate quota 
allocations. The moral claim is analysed using two conceptions of distributive justice, entitlement and 
desert. The conclusion reached is that the under-10m fleet’s entitlement arguments are weaker than 
their desert arguments, but that entitlement arguments weigh more heavily with government.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Discarding is the disposal of marine life, caught alongside targeted species, returned to the sea 
predominantly dead or dying. It is a serious problem, as a large amount of edible fish is dumped at sea 
every year – 7.3 million tonnes globally, according to Kelleher (2005). Much attention has been 
focused on public outrage at this waste of valuable protein (Clover 2005); on research into technical 
methods of reducing the level of unwanted catch (Kennelly 2007); on economic drivers of skippers 
engaged in discarding (Hatcher and Gordon 2005); and on policy initiatives to provide carrots and/or 
sticks to persuade skippers to adopt discard reduction practices (Catchpole and Gray 2010). There has, 
however, been little research into skippers’ grievances against what they perceive to be unfair treatment 
by fisheries managers which causes discarding. Most fish is discarded because it falls below the 
minimum landing size (MLS); or has no market value; or holds less market value than other specimens 
(high grading); or exceeds the boat’s monthly quota allocation. It is the last category - quota discards – 
that is the focus of this paper, because of the allegedly heavy level of quota discarding amongst the 
under-10m sector in Sussex on the southeast coast of England. The paper examines strongly held 
opinions on the issue of quota allocation expressed by under-10m skippers, over-10m skippers, and 
other stakeholders, most of which reflect two conceptions of distributive justice – entitlement and 
desert. Using interpretations provided by two political theorists – Nozick (1974) on entitlement and 
Sadurski (1985) on desert – the paper evaluates these opinions in the light of the two conceptions of 
justice.  
  
In section 2, the methodology and theoretical framework of the paper are explained. Section 3 outlines 
the case study of the quota discarding problem in the Sussex under-10m fleet. In section 4, proposed 
solutions to that problem are rehearsed. Section 5 interprets the opinions expressed by fishers’ and 
other stakeholders on the above problem and its solution in terms of two conceptions of distributive 
justice (entitlement and desert). Section 6 explains that an implication of the paper’s main finding - that 
the under-10m sector’s case is weaker on the criterion of entitlement – is that it is unlikely to succeed 
in its aim of obtaining a redistribution of its quota allocation.     
 
2. Methodology and theoretical framework 
 
Data for this paper is from interviews and newspaper archives. Both provided extensive statements 
from the main players in this controversy - skippers of under-10m and over-10m vessels, and fisheries 
ministers. Face-to-face interviews of twenty under-10 skippers were conducted during July-September 
2009 in four of the Sussex fishing fleets at Brighton, Eastbourne, Hastings, and Rye. These interviews 
generated information about skippers’ opinions on the extent of cod discarding in the Sussex fleets; the 
effects and causes of that discarding; their motives for discarding; their attitudes towards discarding; 
and their suggested remedies for reducing discarding levels. Newspaper archival material came mainly 
from Fishing News, the UK’s premier trade newspaper for the fishing industry, which reports 
extensively on British fisheries. The Fishing News archives of weekly issues over a ten-year period 
(2000-2010), supplemented by Hansard reports of debates in the House of Commons, provided 
extensive information on the situation of the under-10m sector in the UK, including reports of 
statements made by major players in briefings, speeches, and meetings, and (very lively) letter pages 
and editorials. All data used for the paper was qualitative, analysed by means of interpretive or critical 
realism (Fischer 2003). This is a form of discourse analysis (Howarth and Torfing 2005), where the 
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aim is to get behind the overt statements made by stakeholders to ascertain what kinds of moral 
principles of justice are being appealed to, and to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of those 
appeals.  
 
The two most important conceptions of distributive justice were used – entitlement and desert – and 
two leading political theorists were chosen as guides to those conceptions: Nozick (1974) on 
entitlement justice, and Sadurski (1985) on desert justice. According to the entitlement conception of 
justice, people are entitled to keep what they have obtained, provided they do not violate the rights of 
others. Justice as entitlement is “an appeal to established rules or conventions which settle the matter in 
hand without the need to consider other morally relevant factors” (Campbell 2010: 50). According to 
Nozick, there are three elements in the entitlement conception of justice: acquisition, transfer, and 
rectification. On acquisition, people are entitled to appropriate whatever is unowned, provided others 
are not thereby made worse off. On transfer, people are entitled to freely exchange their holdings: 
“whatever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just” (Nozick 1974: 151. On rectification, 
people are entitled to have unjust appropriations and transfers reversed. On the desert conception of 
distributive justice, Campbell (2010: 140) points out that “the idea that justice is a matter of people 
getting what they deserve is perhaps the most common and tenacious of justice”. The desert principle 
asserts that people are responsible for their actions and that it is right that they should take the 
consequences, good or bad, of those actions. As Sadurski (1985: 222; 116) notes, “desert is not 
concerned with the ‘moral worth’ of an individual, but with his socially valuable effort [which 
incorporates]…sacrifice, work, risk, responsibility, inconvenience”. Campbell (2010: 142; 146) agrees 
- “if someone chooses to perform socially useful actions, particularly if these involve the expenditure 
of time, effort or personal resources, then they are deserving of praise and/or reward” – and adds that 
desert may require redistribution of present holdings to match the ideal criteria of desert.  
 
3. Case study: the under-10m fishery in Sussex 
 
In the county of Sussex there are approximately 250 fishing vessels registered across 10 ports, giving 
employment to nearly 500 fishers. These vessels are primarily day boats (ie they set out and return on 
the same day), and are under 10 metres in length. The majority of them use static nets or as 
combination of static and mobile gear. In 2007, almost 6,000 tonnes of fish were landed at Sussex 
ports. The quota fish targeted are cod (Gadus morhua), sole (Solea solea), plaice (Pleuronectes 
platessa), several ray species (Raja), mackerel (Scomber scombrus), herring (Clupea harengus), sprat 
(Sprattus sprattus), and whiting (Merlangius merlangus). Certain areas within the district hold Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC) accreditations for their Dover sole, herring, and mackerel fisheries (MSC 
2005a; 2005b; 2009). The fleets of Brighton, Eastbourne, Hastings, and Rye (see Figure 1) were chosen 
for interviews because skippers in these fleets have reported acute levels of discarding. For example, 
one Hastings skipper stated that “Cod are like a plague out there”.   
  
 
                                                           Figure 1: Map of the Sussex coastline, south east England 
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Skippers said that one of the effects of high discarding is marine pollution. A Brighton skipper claimed 
that “we’re throwing so much back the seabed stinks…it’s polluting the seabed”, and a Hastings 
skipper reported that cod carcasses were subsequently caught in nets and polluted the live fish. In their 
attempts to avoid catching cod, skippers pointed out that they targetted other stocks, such as dab 
(Limanda limanda), which then placed these other stocks under excessive pressure. Moreover, skippers 
held that “Cod are so abundant that they are depleting other species such as cuttlefish [Sepia 
officinalis], Dover sole, red mullet [Mullus barbatus], small shellfish and other small cod” (Fishing 
News 30/10/09: 8-9).  
 
According to the skippers, insufficient quota was the main underlining cause of cod discards. An 
Eastbourne skipper said “It’s the quota regulations…Under a normal course of things, we don’t 
have…a discard problem. It is only the bloody quota system that has forced us into discarding”. A 
tightened winter cod quota meant skippers increasingly used small mesh nets of 90-100mm to catch 
Dover sole (compared to 120mm nets used for cod), creating high by-catch including cod (Fishing 
News 30/10/09: 8-9). A Hastings skipper remarked that “they force you to use smaller meshes, ’cos you 
can’t catch cod…so you end up catching cod…It’s a joke”.    
 
Most fishers discarded because of fear of prosecution “We have no alternative to discard” (Hastings 
skipper). An Eastbourne skipper said that “You can’t land it ’cos you get a massive fine…We don’t 
want to discard”. Many skippers expressed ‘heartbreak’ at having to discard: “It breaks my heart…to 
throw dead fish back…all dead, quality fish going back for nothing” (Brighton skipper). “It’s a terrible 
waste” (Eastbourne skipper). Moral repugnance was a frequent response: “I think it’s absolutely 
disgusting…To discard 10 boxes of cod which are dead is absolutely immoral” (Hastings skipper). 
Some felt guilt: “I feel guilty at wasting food resources” (Eastbourne skipper). Others expressed anger 
and disbelief at the quota system: “There’s so much of it about. We throw back easily four tons a week, 
but yet we have no quota because they say we have no fish…It’s ridiculous really” (Rye skipper).    
 
4. Suggested solutions to the discard problem 
 
Many different suggestions for solving the cod discarding problem were put forward by both skippers 
interviewed and people whose opinions appeared in the columns of Fishing News. These solutions raise 
issues of distributive fairness, as we shall discuss in section 5. 
 
The most frequently suggested solution from interviewees was simply to increase the under-10m fleet 
cod quota. “Give us more quota” (Brighton skipper). Several different methods of increasing the cod 
quota were proposed, the most fundamental being to revisit the original distribution of the cod quota 
between the over-10m sector and the under-10m sector made in 1989. Before 1989, quotas were 
attached to licences rather than to vessels, and every new fishing vessel coming into service was given 
a notional track record to entitle it to a share of the national quota. But after 1989, a distinction was 
made between the quota allocation for the over-10m sector and the quota allocation for the under-10m 
sector, based on their respective track records. Because the over-10m sector had logbook data and 
therefore evidence of their catches and landings over the previous three-year reference period, whereas 
the under-10m sector, which was not required to keep logbooks, had no such evidence, the distribution 
of the cod quota was skewed heavily in favour of the over-10m sector. The under-10m sector was 
allocated only 3% of the cod quota, although it employed the majority of UK fishers and had many 
more vessels than the over-10m sector. In 2006, the over-10m sector comprised 1,508 vessels, mostly 
owned by members of Producer Organisations (POs)
1
 holding 97% of the national quota; while the 
under-10m sector comprised 4,833 vessels, holding 3% of the national quota (Fishing News 10/11/06: 
3). Skippers in the under-10m sector have always regarded this allocation as grossly unfair, because 
they were being punished for not having catch and landing data which they had no legal duty to record. 
They complained that an educated guess could have been made by the fisheries authorities to estimate 
their past track records. Accordingly, they demanded a redistribution of quota.  
                                                 
1
 Producer Organisations (POs) are voluntary organisations that represent the majority of over-10m boats and 
account for about 80% of the UK quotas on managed demersal stocks. Originally established to administer the 
system of withdrawal prices for landed catches, POs acquired the task of sectoral quota management, which 
included the responsibility for distributing to their members quota annually given to the POs by the government. In 
the south of England, membership of POs is less common, as proportionally more over-10m skippers, and almost 
all under-10m skippers, choose to obtain their quotas through the non-sector, which is managed directly by the 
government (Crean 1998).       
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However, a fisheries minister, Jonathan Shaw, said he would not forcibly take quota from the PO 
sector: “People have quotas and I am not going to top-slice” (Fishing News 21/12/07: 2; cf Fishing 
News 8/2/08: 3). Such a move could face a legal challenge: “The officials say they can’t take quota 
back from the [over-10m] sector without risking a legal challenge so the under-10m sector must be cut 
to fit the quota” (Fishing News 16/3/07: 3).  
  
Three other adjustments of the cod quota allocation were proposed. The first was a demand from a 
Brighton skipper for the return of cod quota by owners of over-10m trawlers who decommissioned 
their vessels, and for that relinquished quota to be redistributed to the under-10 sector. It was argued 
that it is legitimate to require the surrender of a public asset in return for the receipt of public funds for 
the decommissioning of the vessel for which the public asset (the quota) was allocated (at no charge) in 
the first place. Moreover, since under-10m vessel owners had to surrender their quota on 
decommissioning (see below), it was inequitable if over-10m vessel owners were allowed to hold on to 
their quota. The second proposal was to transfer unused quota from the over-10m sector to the under-
10m sector: “At the end of the year, most of them haven’t even caught all their quota: why can’t they 
give that to the small boats?” (Hastings skipper). The argument here is that the under-10m skipper’s 
right to make a living trumps the over-10m skippers’ right to hold on to unused  quota.  
 
The third proposal was to use any new (ie additional) allocation of cod quota from the EU to redress 
the imbalance between the under-10m fleet and the over-10m fleet. This method was successfully used 
in 2005, with a doubling of monthly sole quotas for under-10m boats in Area VIIe (Western Channel) 
and the North Sea (Fishing News 18/2/05: 3). Again, in 2006 this method was used by the Department 
of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in allocating to the under-10m sector and the non-
sector the extra prawn TACs agreed at the December 2005 EU Fisheries Council meeting, amounting 
to an extra 100t of North Sea prawns and an extra 160t of West of Scotland prawns (Fishing News 
31/3/06: 2), despite an outcry from the over-10m sector, who argued that the existing allocation criteria 
should be used (Fishing News 31/3/06: 2). In 2009, Shaw’s successor as fisheries minister, Huw 
Irranca-Davies (2009a), proposed to distribute a 30% increase in the total allocation of cod for area 
VIId negotiated at the 2008 EU December Council with approximately 70% going to the inshore fleet. 
As the MP for Hastings and Rye, Michael Foster, remarked, “The allocation appeared to mean that [the 
under-10m fleet’s]…demands were being recognised for the first time…While the 70:30 split was still 
minimal, the principle had been established” (Foster 2009). After consulting with the over-10m sector, 
Irranca-Davies (2009a) reversed this decision and allocated 70% of the new quota to the South West 
Producer Organisation, and only 30% to the under-10m sector. The minister explained his volte face on 
grounds that the over-10m sector had emphatically rejected the proposal, and good practice required 
that he did not alienate the producer organisations.  
 
One further method of increasing the under-10m sector’s cod quota was leasing. In 2002, DEFRA 
decided to allow under-10m vessels to lease (i.e., rent) quota held by the over-10m sector (Fishing 
News 16/8/02: 1). However, quota leasing was too expensive for most under-10m skippers, as Tom 
Brown (Joint Secretary, Southern North Sea Inshore Fishermen’s Association) pointed out: “It’s all 
very well saying they’ll extend quota leasing for the inshore sector to cod, but where will people get 
that sort of money, even if there is any cod to lease? It costs 800 a tonne now…and will probably rise 
to £1000 a tonne” (Fishing News 3/8/07: 3). Leasing also increased high grading and therefore failed to 
deter discarding: “All they’re doing is encouraging even more discards because people will only save 
the very best fish to cover their leasing costs. It flies totally in the face of conservation” (Fishing News 
3/8/07: 3). Moreover, the system of quota leasing raised the vexed issue of ‘slipper skippers’ or 
“armchair moguls”, who owned quota without going to sea, having obtained a commodity that was 
originally distributed free – a practice described by many under-10m skippers as “immoral” (Fishing 
News 21/4/00: 1-2). John Nichol (Committee member, National Under-Ten Fishermen’s Association 
(NUTFA)) said that “Quotas are a national asset and should go to active fishermen, not traders who 
don’t go to sea” (Fishing News 15/2/08: 8). Even within the over-10m sector there was unease about 
‘sofa quota’. For example, George MacRae (Secretary, Scottish White Fish Producers’ Association 
(SWFPA) complained that seagoing skippers were being “held to ransom” by “slipper skippers” 
leasing quota at inflated prices, and “This is inequitable, unfair and totally immoral. It must be stopped 
now” (Fishing News 26/9/03: 3). However, leasing quota has become such a well-established part of 
the fisheries management system that it is now virtually impossible to remove it.  
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DEFRA’s preferred solution to the problem of inadequate quota for the under-10m sector was not to 
increase the quota to match the fleet, but to reduce the size of the fleet to match its quota. DEFRA 
proposed two measures to achieve such a fleet reduction – decommissioning; and two-tier licensing. 
On decommissioning, DEFRA announced in 2008 the provision of £5m for decommissioning under-
10m vessels, targeting the ‘super under-10s’ or high-tech boats that caught the most fish (DEFRA 
2008). Owners of decommissioned boats would have to surrender their licences and their quota 
allocations which would be returned to the under-10m sector quota pool for redistribution to the 
remaining vessel owners. However, the decommissioning scheme was criticised for being under-
funded (£5m would only decommission about 50 vessels, which would result in a miniscule increase in 
quota allocations: one estimate (Fishing News 5/6/09: 4) was from 50kg to 55kg per month of cod 
quota in area VIId); discriminatory (its eligibility criteria was arbitrary); and unfair (it required quota 
surrender by decommissioned under-10m vessels, but not by decommissioned over-10m vessels).  
 
On two-tier licensing, DEFRA (2008) proposed to split the under-10 metre licence into two categories: 
(1) a full licence for boats actively targeting quota species - eligibility for which was recorded landings 
of all quota stocks exceeding 300kg in any consecutive period between July 2006 and January 2008 – 
which would entitle vessels to catch all quota stocks up to the catch limits; and (2) a limited licence for 
the remaining boats – whose recorded landings of all quota stocks did not exceed 300kg in any 
consecutive period between July 2006 and January 2008 – which would entitle vessels to land only up 
to a total of 300kg a year of any combination of quota stocks (DEFRA 2008). This measure was 
designed to prevent the gap left by decommissioned vessels from being filled up by relatively inactive 
vessels being brought into active service. However, the two-tier licensing scheme met with fierce 
opposition from the fishing industry. According to Dave Cuthbert (Co-Chairman, New Under-10 
Fishermen’s Association (NUTFA) at a meeting in September 2008, NUTFA, National Federation of 
Fishermen’s Organisations (NFFO), PO leaders and local representatives “all stressed that licence 
capping was unfair, unjust, highly discriminatory and would destroy the fabric of the under-10m fleet” 
(Fishing News 26/9/08: 3). The view of the meeting was that under-10m fishers who had bought full 
licences had a right to keep them – “The legal principle of ‘legitimate expectation’ that is applied in 
respect of over-10m quota holders should apply equally to under-10 licence holders” (Fishing News 
26/9/08: 3). Owners of limited licences stood to lose thousands of pounds overnight, and one of them, 
David Platt of Portsmouth, argued that fishers should be given compensation for the lost value of their 
licences (Fishing News 29/2/08: 3). NFFO (2008) described the two-tier licence policy as “rough 
justice for the under 10s”, in that the reference period for catch records was very short and arbitrary, 
and it penalised skippers who may well have been pursuing non-target species to take the pressure off 
quota species – the environmentally responsible behaviour that DEFRA should be encouraging, not 
punishing by confining them to a “derisory ‘hobby’ level” of quota. Moreover, the effect of having a 
second class licence which confined the holder to 300kg of fish per year would be to increase high 
grading to maximise the value of the 300kg, and this would mean increased rates of discarding – the 
very opposite of DEFRA’s aim in introducing the two-tier licence scheme.2 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Underlying the arguments used by the under-10m fleet to justify an increased allocation of cod quota, 
are two conceptions of distributive justice – entitlement and desert – the meanings of which have been 
explained in section 2.  
 
5.1. Justice as entitlement 
 
There are many appeals made by the under-10m sector to the entitlement conception of justice in 
seeking resolution of their grievance over their quota allocation. The most important of these appeals 
centres on the issue of the original acquisition of quotas, claiming that the original 97% quota 
allocation to the over-10m sector left the under-10m skippers worse off than they were before the 
                                                 
2
In the event, many skippers who were refused the full licence, simply transferred their licences to the Welsh or 
Scottish authorities, which restored to them to their full licences, since neither area recognises the two-tier system 
(Fishing News 13/3/09: 2). An editorial in Fishing News (13/3/09: 2) commented: “Like so much else in fisheries 
management, the law of unintended effects has come into play. And also, like so much else, it is the result of 
hastily introduced legislation in response to a rapidly developing crisis that ignored the industry’s views – which 
DEFRA sought through a so-called consultation”.  
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allocation, which constitutes a perceived injustice that requires rectification. Tom Brown said that “the 
present quota system is deeply flawed by the unfair way in which quota track record was allowed to be 
created in the first place” (Fishing News 25/1/08: 4). The under-10 fleet argued that although under the 
letter of the law, it may not have been entitled to a bigger share of the original quota because it did not 
have the paperwork to prove its track record of past fishing catches, according to the spirit of the law, it 
is entitled to a bigger share of the quota because it did in fact land a significant amount of fish during 
the reference period. Nick Prust (under-10m vessel owner) explained that “Where we in the under-10 
sector have really lost out is that someone, somewhere dreamed up figures of catches landed from the 
under-10 fleet, which as we now know were inaccurate” (Fishing News 30/1/09: 9). Dr Stephen 
Ladyman (Labour MP for South Thanet), in a fisheries debate in the House of Commons described the 
distribution of the quota between the two sectors as “arbitrary” (Ladyman 2007). Richard Benyon 
(Conservative shadow fisheries minister) said that the share-out between the two sectors was 
“completely disproportionate and haphazard” (Fishing News 11/12/09: 10). 
 
However, the over-10m fleet argued that under the rules, it was entitled to retain its historical 
allocation. Even an under-10m skipper (Nick Prust, Chairman, South West Inshore Fishermen’s 
Association – SWIPA) acknowledged that at the time when the quota allocation between the over-10m 
and the under-10m fleets was made, the only reliable figures came from the over-10m sector: “after all, 
their allocations are based on landings statistics that have a far firmer foundation than those of the 
under-10m fleet” (Fishing News 29/9/06: 4). It would, therefore, be unjust to forcibly take quota from 
fishers who had legitimately acquired it, often at considerable financial cost. Jim Portus (Chairman, UK 
Association of Fish Producers’ Organisations (UKAFPO) stated that the POs “won’t support any move 
to reallocate or redistribute quota”, characterising such a move as “robbing Peter to pay Paul” (Fishing 
News 16/11/07: 20)
3
. Bertie Armstrong said “the quotas are managed within a framework agreed with 
the industry, and the government can’t simply ignore that agreement when it is convenient…The fact is 
that the cake is too small, but that doesn’t mean that DEFRA and the Scottish Executive can use the 
excuse that the quotas are ‘a national asset’ to breach the current system. They can’t just say to the 
under-10s, ‘we didn’t give you enough quota in the past, so now we’re going to give you some more’” 
(Fishing News 11/5/07: 2). George MacRae argued that the government  
  
 “allowed trading in quota to grow and develop over many years. Quotas, fishing licences, and 
 indeed days at sea, have acquired significant commercial value, with quotas being used as 
 security for bank borrowing with the tacit and even expressed support of the UK 
 government…the top slicing of quota entitlement already allocated elsewhere to try to 
 temporarily to resolve major problems of the under-10m fleet…flies in the face of government 
 support for legitimately allocated quota being used not only as fishing entitlement but as 
 security for investment in new vessels etc…government cannot prejudice the legitimate 
 entitlement of existing quota allocation. Many fishermen have borrowed monies to purchase 
 quota entitlement and indeed continue to repay a capital interest on that borrowing…If the 
 government…takes quota from legitimate quota entitlement holders, to redistribute it 
 elsewhere, it could well leave itself open to a legal challenge in the UK and European courts 
 on the basis that the quota management process has been applied with the tacit/express 
 support of government” (Fishing News 23/11/07: 7).  
 
Andrew Oliver (head of sea fisheries and marine environmental law at Hull solicitors, Andrew M 
Jackson) confirmed that the government would face a tough legal challenge if it removed quota from 
the over-10m sector:  
 
 “Many quota holders…have not only quota holding as a result of their track records, but also 
 as a result of quota trading…many…have acquired it from a third party…Such quota has been 
 obtained at considerable cost and quite often as a result of bank borrowing. Whilst many 
 banks know the official position, they do nevertheless lend monies using the quota as security. 
 All of this trading has been with the tacit, if not formal consent and encouragement of 
 fisheries departments…Indeed…decommissioning rounds have allowed fishermen to retain  
 and trade their quota whilst decommissioning their vessels…Although the official position of 
 DEFRA remains that there is no title to quota (or indeed licences), and that it remains a 
                                                 
3
  To which Dave Cuthbert retorted, “As for robbing Peter to pay Paul, there are those that would argue that Peter 
robbed Paul in the first place” (Fishing News 30/11/07: 4). 
 
 7 
 national resource, the legal position may be quite different. This is due to a legal concept 
 known as ‘legitimate expectation’. Legitimate expectation is a principle derived from EU Law 
 which, since the late 1960s, has become an increasing part of UK law. It is generally used in 
 situations where a substantive advantage or benefit has been obtained by a citizen, which it is 
 deemed it is unfair or unreasonable to justifiably then deny them…a legitimate expectation 
 will now arise where a public body has made clear and unambiguous representations upon 
 which it is reasonable for a citizen to rely, provided such representations are not inconsistent 
 with statute…Clearly, if rights to quotas were withdrawn as a result of a redistribution, that 
 would result in prejudice to quota holders in terms of their own quota holding, but also in 
 terms of their business plans and their ability to make repayments to the banks. The banks 
 would also suffer prejudice where they have taken security over quota…[So] any 
 redistribution of quota could well lead to a breach of a quota owner’s legitimate expectations 
 and the very real possibility that any redistribution could be challenged in the courts by way of 
 Judicial Review” (Oliver 2007).  
 
There is also a theoretical difficulty with the principle of rectification. As Campbell (2010: 61) points 
out, “In the actual world there can scarcely be any property that has not been acquired without a degree 
of Nozickean injustice, and it seems…impossible to go back to the beginning and work out the original 
rightful owners of holdings and discount all involuntary transfers”. On this count, the under-10m cod 
quota allocation could be judged to be impossible to rectify since the passage of time (more than 20 
years) means that, for example, many affected players are now dead, and therefore the injustice of their 
historical entitlement (or the loss of entitlement for unknown persons to whom they would have 
transferred their holdings) is now unrectifiable. 
 
Subsequent demands by the under-10m fleet for alternative forms of redress have met with similar 
arguments of entitlement injustice from the over-10m sector. For example, Dave Cuthbert demanded 
the surrender of quota by over-10m vessels when they are decommissioned to be reallocated to the 
under-10m sector, arguing that over-10m vessel “owners must not be allowed to hold on to the quota”, 
and that their surrendered quota would “give the government a chance to rectify the imbalance of 
quota” by redistributing it to the under-10m sector (Fishing News 15/8/08: 8). It is worth noting that 
many members of the over-10m fleet also wanted the quota of decommissioned over-10m vessels to be 
surrendered, though for redistribution within the over-10m fleet not to the under-10m fleet. As we saw 
in section 4, the over-10m sector was strongly opposed to slipper skippers. George MacRae reported 
that “the Association feels that quota should be held by or made available to skippers going to sea 
rather than them having to lease or purchase quota from ‘slipper skipper’ at uneconomic prices” 
(Fishing News 14/2/03: 7). But the idea of transferring any quota that was surrendered on 
decommissioning by an over-10m vessel and redistributed to the under-10m sector was anathema to 
over-10m skippers. Over-10m skippers pointed out that a decommissioned vessel may be of relatively 
little worth compared with the market value of the quota attached to it, so unless the government 
bought back the quota in addition to paying decommission money for the vessel, quotas should be 
retained by the owners. For the government’s part, the fisheries minister at the time, Ben Bradshaw, 
stated that “The quota is not ours to take back. Quotas are set and they are owned by the skippers of the 
vessels, who can transfer them to another boat. We are not able to take that quota back”, adding that if 
the quota were decommissioned, “it would cost us a lot more” (Fishing News 30/3/07: 3). George 
MacRae said that “The Government has so far refused to pay for quota, saying it was given away for 
nothing in the first instance. They also say that even if they did purchase and redistribute quota, they 
could be paying for it again if any vessel that received all or part of the decommissioned quota was 
then decommissioned in the future” (Fishing News 14/2/03: 7). Hamish Morrison (then Chief 
Executive, SFF) added that “the government just will not buy fish – end of story. They have said from 
day one that under no circumstances will they pay money for track record” (Fishing News 15/6/01: 3). 
So while the government denies that quota holders have a cast-iron legal right to their quota, it accepts 
that they have a quasi-legal right to them.    
 
On demand for surrender of unused quota from the under-10m sector, the over-10m skippers argued 
that whether or not they chose to use up all their annual quotas was a commercial decision, and in no 
way undermined their moral entitlement to hold on to any unused quota for following years. Bertie 
Armstrong explained that “The fact is that there was a surplus last year because people are working 
sensibly and trying to work within their quota and with the system. They want to stay legal and plan 
and invest for the future by building new boats, but they can’t do that if they don’t know what the 
government is going to do from one minute to the next. They must be able to depend on the 
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administrations to manage the system within the agreed rules. It’s no answer to the problem to have an 
uncontrolled sector being supplied with quota from a sector that’s doing its best to live with its quotas” 
(Fishing News 11/5/07: 2). On the demand that any new quota should be distributed in favour of the 
under-10m sector to offset the original maldistribution of quota, the over-10m sector argued that all 
new quota should be distributed using the original allocatory keys because that is the basis of stability 
for the whole system of UK fisheries management.   
 
Comparing the entitlement arguments put forward, respectively, by the under-10m and over-10m 
sectors, the latter appear stronger than the former. The claim of ‘legitimate expectation’ which is the 
centrepiece of the over-10m fleet’s case for leaving the quota allocation unchanged, is a much 
weightier entitlement argument than is the under-10m fleet’s complaint that the allocation violated its 
rights and made it worse off than before, and that its lack of landing data should have been discounted 
when the original quota allocation was made. Distributive rules must be founded on a sounder basis 
than guesswork. Ironically, the strength of the ‘legitimate expectation’ argument was attested by the 
under-10m sector itself in its rejection of the government’s two-tier licensing policy. Here, the under-
10m fleet deployed the same argument of legitimate expectation (ie quasi-legal entitlement) that the 
over-10m fleet had deployed against quota re-allocation. Under-10m fishers who had bought full 
licences claimed that they had a right to keep them – “The legal principle of ‘legitimate expectation’ 
that is applied in respect of over-10m quota holders should apply equally to under-10 licence holders” 
(Fishing News 26/9/08: 3).  
          
 5.2 Justice as desert 
 
The under-10m fleet appealed to the desert conception of justice in the cod quota allocation 
controversy, by highlighting, first, lack of desert in the system of quota leasing; second, environmental 
credentials of the under-10m sector, and third, its vital contribution to fisheries-dependent 
communities. On the lack of desert in the system of quota leasing, the under-10m fleet pointed out that 
slipper skippers had done nothing to deserve the rent they obtained for their quota, whereas the active 
skippers who leased the quota risked life and limb to pay off that rent: they were the people who truly 
deserved to own the quota if anyone did. Derek McIver (under-10m skipper, Strathcarron) said that 
“We are now in the sick situation where more money can be made by speculators leasing quotas to 
fishermen, than can be made by the fishermen who risk their lives at sea on a daily basis” (Fishing 
News 18/2/00: 8). Moreover, active skippers did not deserve to be faced with the cost of leasing quota 
that was so expensive it threatened to bankrupt them. The under-10m fleet suffered much more 
hardship than did the over-10m fleet from quota leasing because the smaller scale of its operations 
meant it found it much more difficult to absorb leasing charges 
4
.  
 
On its environmental record, the under-10m fleet argued that it has a better record of environmental 
stewardship than the over-10m fleet. Dave Cuthbert declared that “small-scale fisheries…are, as has 
been well documented, environmentally and eco-friendly, have low impact on stocks, employ more 
people and have a very small carbon footprint” (Fishing News 20/11/09: 4). He claimed that “A large 
proportion of the under-10 fleet are static gear fishermen and given the correct amount of quota would 
have little or no discards, as their gear is very selective” (Fishing News 20/11/09: 4). Rob Penfold 
(Brixham under-10m skipper) claimed that a CEFAS scientist who observed a typical wreck-netting 
trip on his boat was “astounded” at the almost zero level of discards: “we are the most 
‘environmentally plus’ sector of the UK whitefish fleet but we are now forced to tie up while the over-
10m fleet, by far the biggest catchers, can continue fishing” (Fishing News 11/5/07: 3). A Rye skipper 
declared that “We fish pretty clean. We fish as clean as we can within the quota. Can’t get much 
cleaner…The only way more would be if they changed the quota then we could reduce it [discarding] 
more”. Moreover, the Hastings fleet have MSC accreditation for the Dover sole, herring and mackerel 
fisheries to validate their environmental credentials (MSC 2005a; MSC 2005b; MSC 2009; Fishing 
News 14/10/05: 20). Grace (Guardian-online 26/11/09) refers to “several sustainable fisheries around 
the British isles, most notably the Dover sole and mackerel boats that operate out of Hastings, which 
was described by the MSC as ‘the most perfect fishery in the world’”. However, its environmental 
credentials were somewhat tarnished by the fact that, in the days when it was lightly regulated, some of 
                                                 
4
 Peter Caunter (Harwich under-10m netter) complained that “With sole quota costing around £5000-£6000 a 
tonne, an under-10m sole boat would need to spend about £100,000 to be able to fish legally, which is obviously 
out of the question” (Fishing News 25/2/05: 6). 
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the vessels of the under-10m sector – especially the so-called ‘super under-10s’ or ‘rule-beaters’ - used 
to take a vast amount of fish out of the stock (Fishing News 1/6/07: 9; 10/4/09: 18; 20/4/07: 8 ).  
 
On its contribution to fisheries-dependent communities, the under-10m sector’s self-professed 
importance has been repeatedly authenticated by the government. For example, Huw Irranca-Davies 
(2009a) stated that “the under-10 metre fleet is an economically, culturally and socially vital part of the 
life of the UK, in terms not only of coastal communities but the fabric of this island nation…I am 
utterly committed to seeing it not simply eke along but thrive and have a very long-term viable future”, 
and that “In all aspects of our work…we always reach out to the under-10 metre sector. It is a vital part 
of our communities and our economy” (Irranca-Davies 2009b). The Conservative shadow fisheries 
minister – Richard Benyon – pointed out that 51% of the UK catch is landed in three ports, and 49% is 
landed in 280 ports, and affirmed that “I want to make sure that those 280 ports remain viable, and that 
the people who support the fishing industry in those communities can have an industry of which they 
can be proud” (Fishing News 11/12/09: 10).   
 
Moreover, the under-10m fleet is not claiming a disproportionately large reward as its due desert: its 
request is for a relatively small amount of quota to be transferred from the over-10m fleet. Reducing its 
share from 97% to 92% would cause only a small loss to that fleet, whereas the transfer of that 5% to 
the under-10m fleet would cause a considerable improvement in the viability of that fleet. As Michael 
Foster argued: “A doubling of the quota available to the under 10-metre sector would make little 
difference to the over 10-metre industry, but it would be a life-saving change for the under 10-metre 
fleet” (Foster 2009)5.   
 
Comparing the desert arguments of the under-10m and over-10m sectors, the former are stronger. The 
ecological footprint of the under-10m fleet is considerably lighter than that of the over-10m fleet, 
notwithstanding the poor environmental record until 2007 of the super under-10m vessels; the slipper 
skipper effect was much more harmful to the under-10m fleet than to the over-10m fleet; and the 
under-10m fleet’s contribution to small fisheries-dependent communities is much greater than that of 
the over-10m fleet. 
 
5.3 Entitlement trumps desert in the echelons of power           
 
In the above discussion, it has been argued that the under-10m fleet’s appeal to distributive justice for a 
re-allocation of its quota is more well-founded on the desert criterion than it is on the entitlement 
criterion. Whether this means that it has a superior moral case to that of the over-10m fleet depends on 
whether we regard desert as a superior moral criterion to that of entitlement, which is a deep and 
complicated ethical issue that cannot be explored here (Campbell 2010). What can be discussed here is 
the more practical and pressing political issue of whether government regards desert as a more 
compelling claim than entitlement. The answer is that for three reasons, government is more likely to 
favour the argument of entitlement over the argument of desert. First, the government is anxious to 
avoid any legal action from the over-10m sector which could result in its paying out heavy 
compensation for confiscated quota entitlements. Both fisheries ministers and legal opinion 
acknowledge that in court, the over-10m sector’s entitlement claim is likely to triumph over the under-
10m sector’s entitlement claim, and the court is unlikely to be swayed by arguments of desert 6.  
 
Second, the government is predisposed to favour the over-10m sector rather than the under-10m sector, 
partly because the over-10m sector has more economic muscle and therefore more political clout than 
has the under-10m sector. Michael Foster (2009) claimed that “the Department is still in the clutches of 
the big boys who run the producer organisations, and is incapable of breaking out of their control” 
(though he argued that “If fairness so demands, it is for the Government to exercise their discretion 
without fear of producer organisations taking the huff”). It is also because the government (in line with 
the aims of the EU Commission) appears to want to reduce the size of the under-10m fleet to bring it 
under central control. Symes and Phillipson (2009: 4) speculate that “a reduction in the overall size of 
the industry and the elimination of smaller, less profitable enterprises are integral to the reform agenda 
                                                 
5
 Tom Brown (Secretary, Thanet Fishermen’s Association) said that “The UK fishing industry now comprises the 
needy and the greedy” (Fishing News 19/10/07: 4).    
 
6
 Though Clive Mills (West Mersea skipper/owner) asked: “Is it right that the government should be frightened to 
take away the quota, a national asset, from the non-active people for fear of litigation?” (Fishing News 9/11/07: 4). 
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for a leaner, more easily managed fisheries sector”. Clive Mills (Fishing News 1/9/06: 20) claimed that 
DEFRA wants a smaller under-10 fleet: “They are trying to put us out of business to fit in with their 
plan for a small industry with just a few boats…They want to trap us into a system that suits them. The 
quota system is only there to get rid of fishermen by economic pressures”. Dave Cuthbert asserted that 
“There are…over 3000 under-10m vessels in England and DEFRA wants to reduce that number to 
around 800 by the cheapest means possible” (Fishing News 26/9/09: 3). Many under-10m skippers see 
the hand of the EU behind the government as a crucial factor. For example, Lockley reported that in 
October 2009, “Delegates from across Europe attending a two-day workshop in Brussels…said that EU 
fisheries policy discriminates unfairly against small-scale fisheries and fishers” (Fishing News 9/10/09: 
6). Brian O’Reardon, Secretary of the International Collective in Support of Fishworkers which 
organised the workshop, referred to “the CFP’s bias towards the larger-scale sectors, and the myopia at 
national, regional and European level towards the small-scale sector” (Fishing News 9/10/09: 6). Daryll 
Godbold (Thames Estuary under-10m skipper) said “The truth is that Brussels just wants to squeeze the 
inshore fishermen out of business” (Fishing News 27/8/04: 5)7. 
 
Third, for many years, the government (again in line with the EU Commission) has expressed support 
for the introduction of ITQs, and many under-10m skippers see in the government’s role in the quota 
allocation controversy the neo-liberal agenda of the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit report in 2004 (Net 
Benefits) which recommended the introduction of ITQs into the pelagic sector initially, and eventually 
across the board (PMSU 2004). Dave Pessell sees DEFRA’s strategy towards the under-10m fleet as 
divide-and-rule to weaken the sector in order to facilitate the introduction of ITQs: “It is interesting that 
DEFRA has already offered the first of its usual cherries by permitting the under-10s the right to lease 
fish. Divide and conquer is the name of the game and the right to purchase quota will inevitably 
follow” (Fishing News 23/11/07: 2).  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In investigating the problem of discarding of cod in the Sussex under-10m fleet, this paper has traced 
the root of the problem to the controversial allocation of the cod quota between the under-10m fleet and 
the over-10m fleet. Analysis of the deep-seated grievance expressed by under-10m skippers against 
what they perceived to be unfair treatment in this initial allocation has shown its foundation to lie in 
two principles of distributive justice – entitlement and desert. On the criterion of entitlement, the under-
10m fleet’s case was found to be weaker than that of the over-10m fleet; on the criterion of desert, the 
under-10m fleet’s case was found to be stronger than that of the over-10m fleet. However, the 
government was more sympathetic to the entitlement argument than it was to the desert argument 
because it was more likely to prevail in the courts, and the government was politically pre-disposed to 
favour the over-10m sector, because that sector wielded more power than did the under-10m sector; the 
under-10m sector needed rationalising to bring it under central control; and its perceived bloated 
inefficiency stood in the way of the neo-liberal agenda of ITQs. So although on the quota allocation 
issue, the under-10m sector may occupy the moral high ground on the criterion of desert, the over-10m 
sector occupies the legal high ground on the criterion of entitlement, in addition to the political high 
ground on the criterion of economic hegemony.      
 
Acknowledgments  
 
The authors are grateful to the Sussex fishermen who participated in the interviews: a particular debt is 
owed to T. Perrigo. Thanks are also extended to N. Goldberg, A. Korda, P. Hopeswell, A. Zacks, I. 
Selvage and C. Williams.  
 
References 
 
Campbell, T. (2010) Justice, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Catchpole, T. and Gray, T. (2010) Reducing discards of fish at sea: a review of European pilot projects 
Journal of Environmental Management, 91, 3, 717-723 
                                                 
7
 Though the EU’s official policy was to support the inshore sector, as expressed in the CFP 2009 Green Paper: “It 
is essential…to secure a future for coastal, small-scale and recreational fishermen…There is a legitimate social 
objective in trying to protect the most fragile coastal communities from this trend [capacity reduction]” (Fishing 
News 22/5/09: 16).   
 11 
 
Clover, C. (2005) The End of the Line, London: Ebury Press 
 
Crean, K. (1998) The manipulation of property rights: creating the conditions for sustainable 
development in the European Union?, in: Symes, D. (ed.) Property Rights and Regulatory Systems 
in Fisheries, Oxford: Fishing News Books, Blackwell Science 37-47 
 
DEFRA [Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs] (2008) The English Inshore Fleet – 
Looking to the Future, Consultation, August 2008, London: DEFRA 
 
Fischer, F. (2003) Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
 
Foster, M. J. (2009) House of Commons Hansard Debates for14 May 2009, Columns 1095-1098 
 
Hatcher, A. and Gordon, D. (2005) Further investigations into the factors affecting compliance with 
UK fishing quotas, Land Economics 81, 1, 71-86 
 
Howarth, D. and Torfing, J. (2005) Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and 
Governance, Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Irranca-Davies, H. (2009a) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 14 May 2009, Columns 1098-
1103 
 
Irranca-Davies, H. (2009b) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 29 October 2009, Column 433 
 
Kelleher, K. (2005) Discards in the World’s Fisheries: an Update, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 
No. 470, Rome: Food and Agriculture Organisation 
 
Kennelly, S. (ed.) (2007) By-catch Reduction in the World’s Fisheries, Dordrecht: Springer 
 
Ladyman, S. (2007) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 06 Dec 2007, Column 1047 
 
MSC (2005a) Hastings fleet Dover sole (trammel net) certified as sustainable in September 2005, 
Marine Stewardship Council http://msc.org/track-a-fishery/certified/north-east-atlantic/hastings-fleet-
dover-sole-trammel-net (accessed 6/2/10) 
 
MSC (2005b) Hastings fleet pelagic herring and mackerel (two fisheries) certified as sustainable in 
September 2005, Marine Stewardship Council http://msc.org/track-a-fishery/certified/north-east-
atlantic/hastings-fleet-pelagic herring and mackerel (accessed 6/2/10) 
 
MSC (2009) Hastings fleet Dover sole trawl and gill-net certified as sustainable in July 2009, Marine 
Stewardship Council http://msc.org/track-a-fishery/certified/north-east-atlantic/hastings-fleet-dover-
sole-trawl-gill-net (accessed 6/2/10) 
 
NFFO [National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations] (2008b) Rough justice for under 10s, York: 
NFFO, 9/12/08. http://nffo.org.uk/news/rough_justice_for_under10s.html (accessed 9/11/09) 
 
Oliver, A. (2007) Who is entitled to fishing quota? Fishing News, 21/9/07, 10 
 
Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia, Blackwell:Oxford 
 
PMSU [Prime Ministers Strategy Unit] (2004) Net Benefits: a Sustainable and Profitable Future for 
UK Fishing, London: PMSU 
 
Sadurski, W. (1985) Giving Desert its Due: Social Justice and Legal Theory, Dordrecht: D Reidel   
 
Symes, D. and Phillipson, J. (2009) Whatever became of social objectives in fisheries policy? 
Fisheries Research  95, 1-5 
 
 12 
 
